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COMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



WSSWSSES 



WAR PAPER 88. 



Qpeqiqg o| tf^e Rattle o| ^h}^o\\ 






Military ©rdef of tf^e Iso^al l9e|ion 



United §tafes. 



dOfflMANDE[(Y OF THE DI^TI^ICT OF COLUMBIA. 



WAR PAPERS. 
88 

0p6r|ing o| the Rattle o| ^H''oH' 



Companion 

CHARLES MORTON, 

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Retired. 

READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF APRIL 3, 1912, 



PUBLICATION DIRECTED BY THE LITERARY COMMITTEE UNDER AUTHORITY 
OF ORDER OF THE COMMANDERY. 



ChAjJC 






E V73 



®|jf ntttg 0f 11)^ lattl? of S>I)tIolT. 



Fifty years ago next Saturday, the great battle of vShiloh 
opened, on a beautiful, balmy, April, Sunday morning. It was 
the first great battle of the Civil War. It was at the time the 
greatest battle in our history — -the greatest on the western 
hemisphere — and to-day it remains one of the great battles of 
our great war and of modern times and one of the greatest 
in importance, for who can divine the far-reaching results to 
this nation and the world had our army there and then met 
defeat, or had its victory been promptly and vigorously fol- 
lowed up! 

Though some of our generals in that battle developed later 
into the class of the great generals of history, the battle was 
fought without generalship, without plan, and without concert 
of action on either side. It was fought with untrained, undis- 
ciplined and badly armed, badly uniformed troops. It was 
fought by simply desperate, determined, persistent, fierce fight- 
ing ; and for fifty years the battle has been fought over and over 
again on paper, maybe not so fiercely, but as persistently, shed- 
ding not always harmless ink. The stampeded, scared-to-death 
newspaper correspondents at the rear of the battle (which is 
always the place of the greatest confusion and alarms in a battle), 
ignorant of what was going on in front, sent off erroneous, sen- 
sational accounts grossly exaggerated and some wholly untrue, 
that got into the press at once and circulated so rapidly and 
widely that for fifty years the truth has never overtaken them, 
and probably some of them will never be caught and strangled. 
Writers and so-called historians have based their accounts on 
these fabricated, , sensational misrepresentations of the facts 
and propagated them as history, and would-be-considered great 

3 



military experts and critics have passed upon these accounts 
supposedly very wise and conclusive criticisms, which in reality 
are simply bosh. It would take as many hours as I have 
minutes here to-night to substantiate this averment with a 
presentation of the true facts and expose and refute the false 
accounts and criticisms — based on false premises. 

It is my purpose to confine myself, as closely as I can with 
lucidity, to the incidents immediately preceding and during 
the opening of the battle that came under my own personal 
observation, were common knowledge at the time, and to utilize 
a copy of the most recent map in locating the troops; and I 
regret that I cannot compass the story in fewer words and less 
time. 

I will say here, however, that I have very little respect for 
or patience with fireside warriors and the swivel-chair criti- 
cisms of battles after the facts, of those ignorant of the terrain 
of the field, of the difficulties of a commander at each moment 
to understand conditions at every point when conditions are 
constantly and rapidly changing; of the miscarriage of orders, 
of their misinterpretation when received and the changed con- 
ditions since issued, et cetera, et cetera. In battle all is sur- 
mise and guesswork as to the strength of the enemy, what he 
intends to do or will do, and he uses every deception to mislead. 
After the battle every commander can see how he could have 
done better if his perception in the dark had been as accurate 
as his back-sight in the open light of past occurrences; My 
experience has been that almost every one does his very best 
in battle, in the light of his judgment and self-control. There 
is a percentage of skulkers in every battle, but a much smaller 
one than the shirkers of duty in all walks of life. In our history, 
there has been no greater display than on the bloody field of 
Shiloh, of unanimous, spontaneous, heroic effort, fearless 
exposure of life, and self-sacrifice. This was not only from a 



sense of duty as soldiers, but the exploiting of deep-seated ani- 
mosity and antipathy that had grown out of generations of 
rancorous, irreconcilable political differences and controversies 
on subjects that both sides considered vital, now being decided 
by killing off each other to achieve supremacy. 

The Confederate government was thoroughly alarmed and 
desperate. The Union Army was piercing the heart of the 
Confederacy. It was a wedge splitting it wide open, turning 
its strongholds and positions that controlled the Mississippi 
River, and lopping off half of its territory — the great resources 
of its supplies for existence of its armies. The head of the Con- 
federacy appealed for a supreme effort to resist the invasion. 
The governors of the Confederate States proclaimed the danger 
and amplified the appeal for a general, unanimous uprising and 
resistance; and some of them accompanied their State's troops 
to the field of battle and exhorted them to a supreme effort and 
sacrifice; and the battle was fought not only with almost unex- 
ampled bravery, persistence and sacrifice on both sides, but 
with pronounced ferocity. Military organizations of every 
name and nature responded to the hysterical call. The Con- 
federate generals at Corinth were overwhelmed and paralyzed 
by their numbers and varieties, and the movement of the Con- 
federate army was delayed several days in efforts to get them 
into larger organizations to handle. Many organizations made 
no reports, left no records, and their strength and losses never 
will be accurately known, and can be put down truthfully only 
as enormous. 

The divisions of our army and some brigades were so widely 
scattered they could render no mutual support, nor cooperate 
in the battle. Our short lines were overwhelmed by superior 
numbers and overlapped by longer lines that turned our flanks, 
and our forces had to withdraw or be enveloped and captured, 
or killed outright fighting without the hope of success. Our 



lines slowly retired, fighting stubbornly and took strong posi- 
tions to fight again, compelling the enemy to make assaults 
and fight at great disadvantage. So the battle the first day 
was a series or many series of hard-fought combats. Fifty of 
the generals and regimental commanders were killed (45 the- 
first day), and they, of course, made no reports. The officers 
who did make reports were mostly ignorant of the names of 
roads, of streams, of farms, of houses and of places, and made 
them while physically exhausted from the stress of a long, hard 
battle, with poor or no conveniences for writing, and they are so 
brief and so defective that it is simply impossible to construct 
an accurate story of the battle from official accounts. 

The old battlefield is now a National Military Park, and has 
been carefully and accurately surveyed and mapped. The park 
has a constant stream of visitors who participated in the battle, 
on both sides. Major D. W. Reed, chairman of the Park 
Commission, and for many years the superintendent and his- 
torian, has accompanied the visitors over the field and has 
from their recitals traced the movements of each regiment and 
battery in the battle ; and he has written a very accurate history 
of these, and erected monuments and placed markers to indicate 
important points. Joseph W. Rich, of the Historical Society 
of Iowa, who was in the battle, has made a careful study of the 
reports and the latest information relating to the part taken by 
each regiment and battery on the field, and has published a very 
excellent account of the battle. These two histories are the 
very best I have seen relating to the subject. 

The time being so limited to-night, I must take for granted 
that you are all more or less familiar with the geography of the 
zone of operations of our own and the Confederate troops just 
preceding the battle, and of the operations of both and the gen- 
eral situation from a military standpoint. 

Strictly speaking, the troops at Pittsburgh Landing were not 



yet an army. They were landing there daily and were being 
organized into divisions. General Halleck had asked for rein- 
forcements several times, even suggesting that they be sent 
from the Army of the Potomac. Instead, raw, new, untrained 
organizations were rushed from western States as fast as trans- 
portation could be provided. They wore uniforms furnished 
largely by their respective States, some that could not be dis- 
tinguished from those the Confederates wore. Their arms were 
of a great variety, from fair to bad, and of as great a variety of 
calibers. In the battle where the fighting was the heaviest and 
ammunition became exhausted, sometimes none could be found 
to fit the arms, though other ammunition was near at hand. 
Many regiments had never fired their arms at all before the 
battle and some had ammunition issued to them for the first 
time after the battle was on and progressing. Think of that, 
you younger men who have put in many years on a target range 
for instruction! 

I was a private in Company I, 25th Missouri Volunteer 
Infantry, and my regiment was stationed at Benton Barracks, 
in the old Fair Grounds at St. Louis, Mo. The regiment had 
been captured and paroled at the siege of lycxington. Mo., in 
September, 1861, had been mustered out later by order of 
General Fremont, and had scattered. The order had been 
revoked later by the War Department, and the men notified, 
as best they could be, to reassemble. In the meantime many 
had enlisted in other regiments, and some others never rejoined. 
So a large number of the regiment were new, raw men and had 
never been in battle, and most had received very little training. 
The regiment was rushed to the wharf at St. Louis, March 23, 
and sailed on the steamer Continental on the 24th, and with the 
53rd Illinois Infantry were quartered on the open hurricane 
deck, where we were constantly having our blankets, clothing, 
faces and hands burnt by the showers of sparks from the funnels. 



8 

We at first received bread, then crystallized hard-bread and 
raw hogs' jowls for rations, and an uncertain allowance of warm, 
muddy water tinctured with poorly parched bad coffee. But 
bad fare and worse quarters did not dampen the wild enthusiasm 
over the fact that we were going to participate in the active 
operations of the army. We had no definite knowledge of 
where we were to go. Sailing down the Mississippi, there was 
a constant refrain of patriotic songs, participated in by hun- 
dreds of lusty voices. "We'll hang JefT Davis on a sour apple 
tree," was a great favorite, and another one, new, if not impro- 
vised then and there: 

"Oh, the time is now at hand, General Halleck takes command 
Of the forces in the Mississippi valley; 
And we're going with him South to the Mississippi's mouth 
Driving rebels from the happy land of Canaan. 

Hoh, hoh, hoh, hah, hah, hah, hah. 
The time for the brave boys is comin' ; 
It is never mind your mammy but go and join the army 

And fight for the happy land of Canaan." 

When the Continental turned up the Ohio at Cairo, the hope 
grew that we were to go up the Tennessee, where fighting was 
expected to occur soon. This hope grew much stronger when 
we left Paducah. When the Continental turned up the Ten- 
nessee the riddle was solved, and boundless enthusiasm and 
unbridled hilarity prevailed. Spontaneously and almost unan- 
imously there came from hundreds of throats the song: 

"In Dixie's land we will take our stand 
To fight and die for Uncle Sam." 

Almost infinite variations of that song that human wit, rid- 
icule, and hatred could reduce to parody, were sung over and 
over again. On the afternoon of the 26th, all were crazy to 
get the earliest possible glimpse of Fort Henry, the then first 
trophy of importance of the war. As we sped by the captured 



guns, pointing out of the embrasures, and our soldiers in blue 
manning them, and the garrison crowding the banks, we greeted 
them with cheer after cheer to exhaustion. On, on we sped up 
the beautiful river, making a brief stop at Savannah in the after- 
noon of the 27th for the 53rd IlHnois Infantry to disembark, and 
our colonel to report to General Grant for instructions. That 
night, about dark, the Continental crowded her nose between 
two of the many steamers that had their prows in the bank at 
Pittsburgh Landing. We disembarked the next day. There 
was no town, no wharf, and but scant room for stores. 

The day of landing was the first time the regiment had 
ever pitched tents, and our captain was very much exasperated 
over our ignorance of the task in hand. His name was George 
K. Donnelly; he had served many years in the regular 
army and had filled every position of a soldier and non- 
commissioned officer, including those of hospital steward, drum- 
mer and fifer; and he had been carried oflf the battlefield with 
five or six wounds on the bloody but glorious day to our arms 
at Contreras, Churubusco, San Antonio and the Bridge Head. 
He was a man of good education, and full of energy. He knew 
more about military matters than all the other officers of the 
regiment, and was the guiding spirit in its organization, training 
and discipline. He was a strict disciplinarian and of greater 
diversified knowledge of details of military business than any 
officer I have ever met to this day. Almost every man in his 
company that did not fall in battle, die of wounds or was dis- 
charged for disability or deserted, became a commissioned officer 
during the war. I have said this much relating to Captain 
Donnelly because he was a great factor in the battle of Shiloh 
as advisor of the brigade and division commanders — greater 
than will ever be publicly known, and for which service he has 
never received proper credit beyond that of a very limited circle 
of personal acquaintances. 



10 

After the fall of the brigade commander, for whom Captain 
Donnelly was adjutant, the captain was aide for the division 
commander. In the regimental commander's report of the 
battle, Captain Donnelly's name was one of the six officers 
mentioned for special gallantry, and two of the others were 
of my own company: Lieutenants O. P. Newberry and^^. 
Singleton. I will add as a remarkable coincidence that a 
guest casually here to-night. Companion Newberry, is a brother 
of that lieutenant. 

On March 29 the regiment was marched to the very front 
and was the first regiment of the Sixth Division on the ground 
and became the regiment on the right of the First Brigade of 
the Sixth Division, commanded by Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss. 
During the week other regiments arrived one at a time and pro- 
longed the line to the left. This First Brigade was composed 
of the following regiments, from right to left: 25th Missouri, 
iXth Michigan, 21st Missouri, and i^th Wisconsin — all infantry. 
The Second Brigade, commanded by Col. Madison Miller of the 
1 8th Missouri, was to the left of the First Brigade, and was 
composed of only three regiments: i8th Missouri, i6th Illinois, 
1 8th Wisconsin — all infantry; the 4th Regiment was on the 
steamer at the landing on the day of the battle. The regiments 
to compose the Third Brigade, Prentiss' division, to be stationed 
farther to the left, had not arrived before the battle, though 
some of them were at the landing not yet disembarked. Two 
batteries, Kickenlooper's and Munch's, were camped near 
General Prentiss' headquarters. 

Our colonel, Everett Peabody, was assigned the command 
of the First Brigade, and my captain, George K. Donnelly, was 
detailed as his assistant adjutant-general. 

Colonel Peabody was a graduate of Harvard, a civil engineer 
of considerable reputation in the West. He was in the prime 
of life, a large handsome man who had won the admiration of 



II 

his regiment, not only from his personahty, but his bravery at 
Lexington, where he was severely wounded. He and Captain 
Donnelly lived in their respective tents, as pitched with the 
regiment, and the captain exercised a general supervision of the 
company though he was not actually in command of it. Within 
a day or two he took the company out and had target practice, 
using a large tree for a target. He also advocated the intrench- 
ing of our camp. On Wednesday, April 2, I was one of a large 
detachment of the regiment sent out on picket duty on the road 
to Corinth, a couple of miles or so. At night the heavens were 
illuminated in the direction of Corinth by the camp-fires of the 
Confederates, and we were astounded at their apparently near 
proximity and magnitude. The next day men of our party who 
visited farmhouses a little to our front were warned by the 
occupants that they were taking great risks of being killed or 
captured by Confederate cavalry that was scouring the vicinity. 
We were relieved from this outpost duty Thursday afternoon, 
and men who returned from the same duty Friday, the 4th, 
reported that no party had relieved them, and that there was 
no outpost between our camp and the enemy. That same 
Friday two civilians were arrested prowling through our camp. 
They claimed they were hunting for stray cattle. I believe 
they were released. The men looked upon them as spies. 
These matters were much criticized by the men in the camp. 

On April 3, Colonel Buckland, 72nd Ohio Infantry, by order 
of General Sherman made a reconnaissance with his brigade 
four or five miles toward Corinth, and found the enemy in 
such force that he fell back in order not to precipitate an en- 
gagement, prohibited by existing orders of General Halleck 
"not to make any advance" until General Buell's army had 
arrived. That army was marching leisurely to Grant's relief 
at the rate of twelve miles a day, while the Confederate generals 
were making superhuman efforts to crush Grant's army before 



12 



Buell could reinforce it. This was due to a lack of coordination 
in the exercise of authority over our armies. 

On the 4th of April the picket line in front of Buckland's 
brigade was attacked, and a lieutenant and seven men were 
captured. General Buckland went out with a regiment to 
investigate, and two of his companies were surrounded by Con- 
federate cavalry, and were saved from capture only by the 5th 
Ohio Cavalry arriving timely, routing the enemy and capturing 
several prisoners. This affair developed the enemy in con- 
siderable force — cavalry, infantry and artillery. General Sher- 
man required Colonel Buckland to make a special written official 
report of this whole affair as he feared it might have precipitated 
a general engagement. Our generals seemed to be obsessed 
with the notion that any kind of action, even a defensive one, 
might provoke the enemy into giving battle. Indeed, General 
Sherman said on the 5th: "I know the enemy is out there, 
but my hands are tied." 

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 5th, the Sixth Division 
was reviewed by General Prentiss in the Spain field. It was 
common talk in the camp after the review that Confederate 
cavalry had come up to the fence on one side of the field and 
witnessed the review. This was confirmed from other sources, 
and later by the Confederates. At retreat that same afternoon. 
Captain Donnelly, though adjutant-general of the brigade, 
came to the company and said there was going to be a big battle; 
that the enemy was approaching in force within a few miles, and 
that he wanted to see his company ready for the engagement. 
He inspected minutely the arms and ammunition of every man, 
and then advised the men what to do under different circum- 
stances in battle. The company slept on its arms that night, 
and I believe so did all the regiment that slept at all. It 
was not a favorable condition for quiet and peaceful sleeping. 



13 

Some of the officers remained up all night in anxiety and watch- 
fulness. 

Our major was James E. Powell, a captain of the ist Infantry 
of the regular army. He was field officer of the day for the 
First Brigade on April 5. During the night he took two 
reliefs of the brigade guard, made a reconnaissance to the front 
and gof in contact with the enemy. He returned and reported 
the result to the brigade commander. Colonel Peabody, who sent 
him out again at 3 A. M., with Companies B, E, and H of the 
25th Missouri, and two (possibly three) companies of the first 
regiment on our left, the /£th Michigan. The captains of the 
25th Missouri who went out with Powell were Joseph Schmitz, 
Co. B; Simon S. Eavans, Co. E; and Hamilton Dill, Co. H. 
The first two had led their companies in the bayonet charge on 
the hospital during the siege of I^exington, when it was in pos- 
session of the enemy and his fire could not be returned without 
endangering our own sick and wounded. Captain Dill had been 
in the war with Mexico; and all were fighters. I do not have 
the names of the captains or letters of the companies of the i6th 
Michigan, but Lieut. -Col. Thomas A. Swobe, U. S. Army, 
retired, was a soldier in one of the companies of that regiment 
and went along. William H. Hahn, now a resident of Omaha, 
Nebraska, was also with Powell's command, a soldier in Co. B, 
25th Missouri. Both these gentlemen are well known to me. 
Powell's command struck the enemy's outpost at 4.45 A. M. at 
the edge of the Fraley field when it was too dark for very effec- 
tive firing, and drove it back on its reserve, under Major Hard- 
castle, at the southeast corner of the Fraley field. Major Powell 
engaged the enemy for about an hour and a half when he had to 
give way to a force of a whole brigade, but fell back slowly, 
stubbornly fighting step by step. The major was killed later 
in the day at the Hornet's Nest and left no official report. Both 
Colonel Swobe and Lieutenant Hahn have given me a written 



14 

detailed account of what occurred at the Fraley field, but I prefer 
to give some brief extracts from Confederate ofRcial reports 
relating to this affair. Major Hardcastle says in his: "The 
firing began about dawn * * *. The enemy opened a heavy 
fire on us at a distance of about two hundred yards. * * * We 
fought the enemy an hour or more without giving an inch. * * * 
About 6.30 A.M. I saw the brigade formed in my rear and I fell 
back." Hardcastle also reported that his outpost had "four 
men killed and nineteen wounded." General Bragg, who 
commanded the second line of the Confederate army, says in his 
official report: "the enemy did not give us time to discuss the 
question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a heavy 
musketry fire on our pickets." 

I might ask right here which army was surprised at the battle 
ofShiloh? 

Meantime Colonel Peabody ordered Colonel Moore, of the 
2 ist Missouri, to reinforce Powell's command. Moore started 
with five companies and met Powell's command being forced 
back. He sent for his other five companies, under lieutenant- 
Colonel Woodyard, and was joined by four companies of the 
i^th Wisconsin that was on picket duty in the vicinity. Their 
principal fighting was at the northwest corner of the Seay field, 
where Colonel Moore lost a leg and Lieutenant Mann of the same 
regiment was wounded, and Captain Saxe of the i^th Wisconsin 
was killed. It is believed now that Captain Saxe was the first 
officer killed in the battle. These fourteen companies were 
fighting Shafer's brigade of four regiments, and perhaps a part 
of Gladden 's and Chalmers' brigades. It was said at the time, 
and it was the general talk later, that Colonel Peabody visited 
General Prentiss several times during the night and sent him 
word time and again of the situation. The general failed to 
take any action. 



15 

vSoon after daybreak the killed and wounded of Powell's com- 
mand were being brought into camp, and the companies of the 
regiment formed in the company grounds. Finally Colonel 
Peabody ordered the long roll sounded. It was taken up regi- 
ment after regiment and spread throughout the army. My 
regiment at once formed into line, under command of Lieut. - 
Col. R. T. Van Horn (still living near Kansas City). The other 
regiments and parts of regiments of the brigade formed lines 
also, and all waited for orders. Colonel Peabody was on his 
horse in front of the regiment while it was waiting, when Gen- 
eral Prentiss came riding in high speed down in front of 
the line and jerked up his horse in front of Colonel Peabody.- 
There was a stormy interview, seen by all and heard by some. 
My brother Marcus (afterwards a lieutenant in the regiment 
and later a captain in another) was orderly for Colonel Peabody 
at the time and he both saw and heard what transpired. He 
said then and says now: "General Prentiss in a towering rage 
said to Colonel Peabody, 'I will hold you personally responsible 
for bringing on this engagement;' and Colonel Peabody, in mag- 
nificent indignation and ill-concealed contempt, replied to 
General Prentiss, T am personally responsible for all my official 
acts.'" What was said at this interview has been recorded in 
a variety of words, but all are of the same import — the general 
in anger and indignation accused the colonel of bringing on 
the battle, and the colonel resented it with indignation and 
contempt. 

The regiment marched "in line" straight to the front of our 
camp, half or three-quarters of a mile, and halted on a gently 
inclined ridge, a short distance east of the Rhea field. The other 
organizations of the brigade were marching "en echelon," and 
were a little later getting on to the line of my regiment. We 
could hear Colonel Moore's command engaged, on our left a 
little to the front. vStanding at rest we were soon dumbfounded 



i6 

by seeing an enormous force of Confederate troops marching 
directly toward us over a gently sloping ridge in front. They 
were not over 150 yards away, closely massed, seemingly in 
close column of regiments. Colonel Van Horn gave to the 
regiment the commands: "Attention — ready — aim — lire!" 
This was before the enemy had fired a shot at our command or 
appeared to be aware of our presence. He was probably trying 
to turn or cut off Colonel Moore's command. We know now 
that this was Wood's brigade, composed of seven regiments; 
while our own force consisted of only 21 companies, or one 
company in excess of two regiments. 

• Our volley not only staggered the enemy's column but deci- 
mated it. It was so compact and dense that only the front line 
could return our fire; and we suffered but little at first. Indeed, 
the enemy was so badly repulsed and staggered that we could 
see and hear the efforts of the officers to hold their men. We 
kept up a heavy fire during his deployment into line. These 
were about the first casualties in the battle, and no doubt many 
of the killed and wounded were carried from the field early ; but 
the number found at this place after the battle was simply 
appalling. When the enemy got deployed his fire became furi- 
ous. After our first volley our fire was " at will,' ' and when the 
enemy 's fire became heavy we took shelter behind the large oak 
trees that covered the ground that was otherwise open and 
fairly free from brush. We held them in check by our heavy 
fire, and we yelled at them and jeered at them, calling out: 
"Why don't you come on? Why don't you come on?" And 
they would yell in reply: "Bull run! Bull run!" They out- 
numbered us so greatly that they enveloped our flanks, and we 
had to yield ground, but did so slowly — falling back from tree 
to tree, keeping up a constant fire. My regiment was composed 
almost wholly of plainsmen, discharged soldiers from the reg- 
ular army (recruited in Kansas City and vSt. Joseph) and of 



17 

country boys, all of whom were use to hunting. They not only 
had trees for cover but for rests in firing, making their aim 
deadly and the enemy chary in pressing us. But he kept 
turning our flanks. So we fell back slowly from tree to tree till 
our camp was reached. The front of our camp on the right 
was open for 150 or 200 yards, and this space the enemy dared 
not attempt to cross under our fire, for in our camp we had the 
shelter of trees, and the tents concealed us from their view. 
We made a determined and desperate stand to hold our camp 
and we held them in check in front and on our right. We 
really thought we had them permanently checked, and we 
wondered why reinforcements did not come. There had been 
ample time for troops at the rear to reinforce us. The range 
we were firing was long for our arms, and we were wishing and 
openly talking for a battery to help us in our struggle. The 
colonel rode along the line, pallor and determination in his 
handsome face, and undoubtedly mortified at our enforced 
retrograde. He conjured the men to hold their ground, and 
pointing to the gold letters on our flag, said in his impressive 
voice: "Lexington, men, Lexington; remember Lexington!" 
No one can estimate accurately the flight of time under fire in 
battle, so I cannot say how long we held our ground. For 
some time the battle had lulled on our left, where we could not 
see what was transpiring owing to trees and brush, and we 
began to think the battle was over, except in our own front. In 
time a dun horse-battery came down the road from the left 
and front at a gallop, and joy sprang in every heart and face. 
Personally, I said to my brother William, at my side: "We'll 
give them hell now, a battery is coming." He had hardly 
chided me for my language when the battery halted within 100 
yards, unlimbered and opened fire on us with grape and can- 
ister. Horrors of horrors! Crash — crash — crash, came the 
showers of iron hail. The ground was plowed up around 



i8 

us; the canvas of the tent was ripped and torn in our ears; the 
bark and hmbs from the trees rained on us ; the dust Winded us 
and choked us. But stiU crash — crash — crash came the 
deafening, merciless sound and missiles. Finally a shell 
exploded in a big dirt bake-oven in the company street, and 
we were pelted with splinters, showered with clods, and suffo- 
cated with dust. We could not help it — we had to let go and 
take to our heels. We did not know that the entire left of our 
division had given way. Just behind the line of tents of our 
field officers, out of sight of the battery, a small party of us 
made another stand behind some trees for cover. While 
there the colonel's horse ran by riderless, the stirrups flapping 
in the air. We knew our brave and noble colonel had fallen. 
Soon Captain Donnelly, the brigade adjutant, came riding up 
to us from the rear and asked, with some asperity, why we had 
not fallen back. I answered that we had received no orders to 
retire. He then told us that the brigade was forming, and 
pointed in the direction of the wheat field, where we found it 
in line at the north end. It was soon engaged in the desperate 
defense of the Hornet's Nest, where Major Powell fell. 

Colonel Peabody's body was found after the battle on the 
left of our regiment's camp. His remains were shipped for 
burial to vSpringfield, Mass. In the cemetery there, a monu- 
ment, draped with his country's flag, bearing the words: 
"Lexington, Shiloh, 25th Mo. Inf'y" — all cut in .marble, 
marks his grave. We have read of many "Heroes of Shiloh," 
but none of his name — the name of the man whose devotion to 
duty and country cost him his life — the man whose vigilance 
and energy, persistence and bravery, saved the army from utter 
surprise and defeat and the Union cause and the world from the 
far-reaching consequences of such an incalculable catastrophe. 
Probably no man of our armies in our entire history has rendered 
his country on one occasion more valuable services than Colonel 



19 

Peabody at Shiloh; and j^et, outside a few survivors of his regi- 
ment and his immediate relatives, he is hardly known, and is 
unhonored and unsung. 

This properly ends what I know personally and learned, as 
I have said, about the opening of the battle of Shiloh. But I 
can give in a few words from authentic sources an outline of 
what occurred to the left part of Prentiss' Division at the first 
onset of the Confederate forces. Miller's brigade of three 
regiments took position in front of the Spain field, where it 
and Moore's and Powell's commands, under General Prentiss, 
were driven back by vShafer's and Gladden 's brigades, of four 
and five regiments respectively (and perhaps Chalmer's brigade 
of five regiments), but only after a fierce and unequal contest. 
Prentiss' command then took position in front of the "Hornet's 
Nest," on Hurlbut's division. These Confederate brigades 
were followed up and supported by the brigades of Jackson 
(4 regiments), Bowen (4 regiments), Stratham (6 regiments) 
— in all 14 regiments. 

Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division was camped far to 
the left of Prentiss' division, and was composed of three regi- 
ments, 71st Ohio, 54th Ohio, and 56th Illinois. It was formed 
promptly after the alarm, and took a strong position to the left 
of its camp. It was assaulted about 10.30 A.M. by Chalmer's, 
Jackson's and Bo wen's brigades of 13 regiments and put up a 
most stubborn fight. It was forced back to a second position, 
which it held by desperate fighting until after 2 o'clock, when 
it had to retire after having its left flank turned. The colonel 
of the 71st Ohio, an utterly incompetent officer, was cashiered 
for his conduct in the first engagement. After firing one volley 
at the enemy he marched his regiment off the field and took no 
further part in the first day's battle; so that, in reality, Stuart 
had but two regiments to resist the overwhelming superiority 



20 



of the enemy, by a persistence that possibly saved the day, by 
the delay he caused so large a part of the Confederate Army. 

General Sherman tells in his memoirs how the two brigades 
of the right of his division were formed for battle, after the 
attack on Prentiss, and how they were forced back by over- 
whelming numbers. 

It is hoped this rambling, incomplete account of the opening 
of the battle will shed a little true light on how the troops at 
Shiloh "were surprised in their camp early in the morning," 
"bayoneted in their beds" and "fled from their tents in their 
shirt-tails" as has been told in authentic history for fifty years. 
Such history is most properly called "profaned 



